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Abstract
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess
system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg
games. In such games, the leaders play and choose their actions based on their information about
the system and the followers choose their actions myopically according to their observations of the
aggregate impact of other users. However, obtaining the exact value of these parameters is not practical
in communication systems. To study the effect of uncertainty and preserve the players’ utilities in these
conditions, we introduce a robust equilibrium for Stackelberg games. In this framework, the leaders’
information and the followers’ observations are uncertain parameters, and the leaders and the followers
choose their actions by solving the worst-case robust optimizations. We show that the followers’ uncertain
parameters always increase the leaders’ utilities and decrease the followers’ utilities. Conversely, the
leaders’ uncertain information reduces the leaders’ utilities and increases the followers’ utilities. We
illustrate our theoretical results with the numerical results obtained based on the power control games in
the interference channels.
Index Terms
Robust game theory, resource allocation, Stackelberg game, worst-case robust optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stackelberg games provide a general framework to analyze and design hierarchical interactions among
rational, self-interested decision makers (players) [1], [2]. These hierarchical non-cooperative games
consist of two groups of players: leaders, which have complete information about the other players,
and followers, which have no system information. First, each leader selects its action by solving a
bi-level optimization problem which seeks to maximize the leader’s utility subject to the followers’
actions as estimated by the leader’s information. The followers then select their actions according to their
observations from the aggregate impact of other users.
2Recently, the authors in [3]–[5] have formalized the power control problem in interference channels
as Stackelberg games. In these papers, the utility of each user is its throughput and its action is its
transmission power. The leaders’ information contains the direct and interference channel gains of all the
users, and the impacts of users on each other are the amount of interference at their receivers. In this
system model, the leaders first determine their transmit powers. Next, the followers’ receivers measure
(observe) the amount of interference and feed back this value to their transmitters. Finally, the followers’
transmitters determine their transmission powers based on this estimated value of the interference. The
information possessed by the leaders results in an increase in the leaders’ throughput as well as the
followers’ throughput in some cases (see e.g., [3]).
However, extracting accurate system information either by the leaders or the followers is a key
practical issue when implementing Stackelberg games in communication systems because obtain accurate
information is costly and difficult. For example in wireless communication systems, fading, channel
noise, delayed in feedback channels, and users’ mobility cause uncertainty in the players’ parameters.
Consequently, not knowing the accurate values of these parameters may lead to worse utilities for both
the leaders and the followers. Therefore, it is essential to consider these uncertain parameters and apply
the robust approach to guarantee the utilities of both leaders and followers.
Robust optimization theory is a branch of applied mathematics to mitigate the impact of uncertain
parameters in the solution of optimization problems. In this context, the uncertain parameter is first
modeled as a nominal (estimated) value plus an additive error (the uncertain part) [6]. In the next step,
the optimization problem with nominal values (referred to the nominal optimization problem) is mapped
to another optimization problem (called the robust counterpart) in which the uncertain parameter is a
new optimization variable [7], [8].
Generally two basic approaches are applied to define this maping [6], [7], [9]: Bayesian approaches
where the statistics of error is considered and the utility is statistically guaranteed, while the worst-case
approaches where the error is assumed to be bounded within a specific region (uncertainty region) and
the utility is guaranteed for any realization of error within this region. Both these approaches have been
applied in communications, economics, and mathematics to tackle uncertain parameters in Stacklberg
games [10]–[14]. In this paper, we choose a worst-case approach to guarantee the players’ utilities under
uncertainty within a uncertainty region. Based on the above terminology, we refer to the Stackelberg game
and its equilibrium with nominal parameters as the nominal Stackelberg game (NSG) and the nominal
Stackelberg equilibrium (NSE), respectively. Moreover, the Stackelberg game and its equilibrium where
the uncertainty exist and robust optimization is applied, we call the robust Stackelberg game (RSG) and
3the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), respectively.
The most related work to this paper is [14] which considers one-leader one-follower Stackelberg
game and assumes that the leader does not know the exact values of some parameters to estimate
the follower’s action. By minimizing the second order sensitivity function of the leader’s utility with
respect to the uncertain parameters, the paper determines the worst-case utility for the leader given its
imperfect information. However, to implement the RSG in communication systems, we encounter different
challenges: 1) What is the definition of the RSE if the leaders and followers have different uncertain
parameters? 2) What is the performance of the system at the RSG compared to that of the NSG? 3) How
can we overcome the additional computational complexities involved where the leader needs to solve
the bi-level robust optimization problem? 4) How can we generalize the RSG for multiple-leaders and
multiple-followers communication scenario?
To answer the above questions, we first distinguish between the players’ uncertain parameters. As
stated before, in the Stackelberg game, the actions of the leaders and the followers are determined by
the leaders’ information and the followers’ observations about the aggregate impact of other players,
respectively. Consequently, we assume that the uncertain parameters include the leaders’ information
and the followers’ observations. Then, we determine two cases for the RSE: in case 1, the followers’
observations are noisy while the leaders possess complete and accurate information sets, and in Case 2,
the leaders’ information sets are uncertain in addition to the followers’ noisy observations.
To evaluate the performance of the RSG compared to that of the NSG, we define two criteria: i) the
difference between the players’ strategies at the RSE and NSE and ii) the difference between the players’
utilities at these two equilibria. Our results show that for case 1, the uncertain parameters increase the
leaders’ utilities and decrease the followers’ utilities. The leaders’ strategies are increasing functions and
the followers’ strategies are decreasing functions with respect to the uncertainty region. In contrast, for
Case 2, the leaders’ uncertain information decreases the leaders’ utilities and increase the followers’
utilities. The leaders’ strategies are decreasing functions and the followers’ strategies are increasing
functions with respect to the uncertainty region. For both of these two cases, we derive the conditions
(in terms of system parameters and interactions among users) under which the social utility at the RSE
increases as compared to that at the NSE.
In this paper, we derive the relation between the players’ strategies at the RSE and at the NSE based on
system parameters and bounds of the uncertainty region. Based on this, the complexity associated to the
leaders solving robust bi-level optimization problems is reduced considerably. We initiate the analysis of
the RSE for the one leader-one follower communication scenario, and generalize it to a multiple-leaders
4and multiple-followers scenario.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model and game formulation
are presented, followed by the definition of the uncertain parameters in Section III. In Section IV, two
cases for the RSE are introduced and analyzed for the one-leader one-follower scenario. In Section V,
we apply our theoretical findings to power control games and provide numerical results for the RSE.
In Section VI, we extend our framework for the RSG to the multiple-leaders and multiple-followers
scenario, followed by our conclusions in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM SETUP
A. Network model
Consider a set of communication resources divided into K orthogonal dimensions, e.g., frequency
bands, time slots, and routes, which are shared between a set of N users. Each user consists of both of
a transmitter and receiver. The set of possible positive transmission actions of the nth user over all the
dimensions is given by
An = {an = (a
1
n, · · · , a
K
n )|a
k
n ∈ [a
min
n,k , a
max
n,k ], }, ∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K
where K = [1, · · · ,K] and N = [1, · · · , N ]. As an example of such a communication system, consider
the transmission in the interference channels over K subchannels as depicted in Fig. 1. We denote an
achieved utility of user n with vn(a), where a = [an, a−n] and a−n = (a0, ..., an−1, an+1, ..., aN ) is a
vector of other users’ actions except user n.
We assume that: A1) the utility function of each user is an increasing, twice differentiable, and concave
with respect to an; A2) the utility function of user n can be expressed as
vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) =
K∑
k=1
vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n(a−n, xn)), (1)
where fn(a−n, xn) = [f1n(a−n, xn), ..., fKn (a−n, xn)] is the 1 ×K vector of the linear aggregate impact
of other users on user n as
fkn(a−n, xn) =
∑
m∈N ,m6=n
akmx
k
nm + y
k
n (2)
where xn = [xn1, · · · , xn(n−1), xn(n+1), · · · , xnN , yn] is the system parameters of user n, xnm is the
1 × K vector and xknm represents the system parameters between user m and user n in dimension k;
yn = [y1n, · · · , yKn ] where ykn denotes the impact of system on user n in dimension k. For example, in
Fig. 1, fkn(a−n, xn) is the interference of the other users on user n in subchannel k i.e., fkn(a−n, xn) =
5∑
m6=nH
k
nma
k
m + σ
k
n, where Hknm is the channel gain between user m and user n in subchannel k, and
akn is the transmitted power of user n in subchannel k. For this example, the interference channel gains
between the users and the noise in each subchannel are the system parameters i.e., xnm = Hnm where
Hnm = [H1nm, · · · ,HKnm] and ykn = σkn. A3) The utility of user n is a decreasing function of fkn(a−n, xn);
A4) the utility function of each user is twice differentiable over an, and fn(a−n, xn).
Note that A1 is a common assumption for the utility function of all users in the communication
systems [15], [16]. In multiuser communication, A2 and A3 are well-known when the users share the
same resources among each other and have a negative impact on each other [17]. A4 indicates the
differentiability of utility of each user with respect to an and fn(a−n, xn). Therefore, all of the above
assumptions are practical conditions for communication systems.
This setup includes different game theoretic formulations of communication systems such as additively
coupled sum constrained games [17], which can model many communication systems for example, i)
cellular transmission within a given cell, ii) adhoc wireless networks transmission. In this paper, we
choose power control games as an illustrative example, where the throughput of each user in the system
is its utility i.e., vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) =
∑K
k=1 log(1 +
Hknna
k
n
fkn(a−n,xn)
).
The information set obtained by user n is denoted by In, and it may be empty or contain all the
private information of other users in the system such as their utilities, and their system parameters. Also
the information set of each user may be different from the others. The users with empty and non-empty
information sets are referred to as uninformed or informed users, respectively.
Clearly, ∂v
k
n(a
k
n,f
k
n(a−n,xn))
∂akn
is the rate of change of utility of user n corresponding to its action which
has a positive value based on A1. A larger value of ∂v
k
n(a
k
n,f
k
n(a−n,xn))
∂akn
means a larger rate of increase of
the nth user’s utility with respect to its action. For example, in power control games, we have
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n(a−n, xn))
∂akn
=
Hknn
fkn +H
k
nna
k
n
,∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K. (3)
When the user has a larger direct channel gain i.e., Hknn ≫ 1 or it has a small interference i.e., fkn ≪ 1, this
value is large. This means that a small change in the user’s action causes a large change in the user’s utility.
We consider the column gradient vector of vn for user n, represented by Jnan = ∇anvn(an, fn(a−n, xn))
as an internal rate of user n. Also, let define
Cnm = XnmJnfn , (4)
where Jnfn = ∇fnvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) and Xnm , diag{(xknm)Kk=1}. For example, in power control games,
Cknm = −
HknnH
k
nma
k
n
fkn(f
k
n +H
k
nna
k
n)
,∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, (5)
6where Cknm is the kth element of Cnm. Clearly, larger values of Hknm lead to larger values of Cknm or
larger impact of user m on user n. This example shows that Cnm denotes the rate of decrease in utility
of user n which is linearly related to a corresponding increase in the action of user m. We call Cnm as
the negative impact of user m on user n. In the following sections, we use Cnm and Jnan to study the
effect of robustness on the social utility at the RSE compared to the NSE.
B. Game formulation
Now we model the interaction between informed and uninformed users in communication systems
as a Stackelberg game. Assume that the leaders and followers of the Stackelberg game are denoted by
Nl = {1, · · ·Nl} and Nf = {1, · · ·Nf}, respectively and, N = Nl ∪ Nf is the set of all players in the
game, where
In = {(Am, vm,Xmn,Xmm,Xnm)m6=n,∀m∈N } if n ∈ Nl
In = ∅ if n ∈ Nf
where Xmn , diag{(xkmn)Kk=1} and Xmm , diag{(xkmm)Kk=1}. In the Stackelberg game, the leaders first
play their strategy. Then, the receiver of follower n measures the value of fn(a−n, xn) and sends it to its
corresponding transmitter to decide its action. Since the value of fn(a−n, xn) can be considered as the
observation of follower n from the aggregate impact of other users, we refer to it as an observation of
user n. Therefore, the followers’ optimization problems can be formalized,
max
an∈An
vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)), ∀n ∈ Nf (6)
The solution to (6) for user n represents its best response, denoted by a∗n(a−n). Since the followers
are non-cooperative players, the equilibrium point of the game emerging among them is a∗NE =
(a∗1, · · · , a
∗
Nf
), which satisfies
vn(a
∗
n, fn(a∗−n, xn)) ≥ vn(an, fn(a∗−n, xn)) a∗n ∈ An, (7)
where a∗−n = [a∗0, ..., a∗n−1, a∗n+1, ..., a∗N ] for all n ∈ N . If In = ∅ for all players, the game reduces to a
strategic non-cooperative game.
To define the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, we consider that there is only one leader in the
Stackelberg game which has index 0. The Stackelberg game equilibrium prescribes an optimal strategy
for the leader if the followers play their NE. For example, in a one-leader one-follower Stackelberg
7game, when player 1 is a follower, an action a∗0 is the Stackelberg Equilibrium strategy for the player 0
if a0 ∈ A0 we have
v0(a
∗NSE
0 , f0(a∗1(a∗NSE0 ), xn)) ≥ v0(a0, f0(a∗1(a0), xn)). (8)
In this case, the leader’s optimization problem changes to the following bi-level optimization
max
a0∈A0
v0(a0, f0(a1, xn)), ∀n ∈ N (9)
subject to: max
a1∈A1
v1(a1, f1(a0, xn)).
For multi-follower scenario, let a∗−0(a0) = [a∗1, · · · , a∗N−1] be the NE strategy of the followers if player
0 plays a0. The strategy profile (a∗NSE0 , a∗NSE−0 (a∗NSE0 )) is the Stackelberg game equilibrium iff
v0(a
∗NSE
0 , f0(a∗NSE−0 (a∗NSE0 ), x0)) ≥ v0(a0, f(a∗−0(a0), x0)),∀a0 ∈ A0,
The achieved utility of player n at the NSE and the social utility of the game are denoted by ωNSEn and
ωNSE =
∑
n∈N ω
NSE
n , respectively.
Note that if the followers’ game has multiple Nash equilibria, the definition of the Stackelberg equi-
librium is more complicated as described in [2], [18]–[20]. In this paper we restrict our study to the
Stackelberg game with a unique NE in the followers’ game. The uniqueness condition for this game is
provided in Section VI. In the following, we define the uncertain parameters in the system and based
on them, we introduce different types of RSE and the robust counterpart optimization problems for both
leaders and followers.
III. UNCERTAIN PARAMETERS
As stated before, both the followers’ observations and the leaders’ information sets are uncertain
parameters in the considered communication scenario. In the following subsections, we define the fol-
lowers’ uncertain observations and the leaders’ uncertain information set which we noisy observations
and incomplete information sets, respectively.
A. Noisy observation
Consider the uncertain value of fn(a−n, xn) as noisy observation of user n of the impact of the other
users, which is modeled as the summation of a deterministic nominal value and an error [21], i.e.,
f˜n(a−n, xn) = fn(a−n, xn) + f̂n(a−n, xn), (10)
8where f˜n(a−n, xn) = [f˜1n(a−n, xn), · · · f˜Kn (a−n, xn)], fn(a−n, xn) = [f1n(a−n, xn), · · · fKn (a−n, xn)], and
f̂n(a−n, xn) = [f̂1n(a−n, xn), · · · f̂Kn (a−n, xn)] are the actual, nominal and the error of the observation
of user n, respectively. In the worst-case robust optimization theory, the error of noisy observation is
assumed to be bounded in a closed region named an uncertainty region [21], [22]:
ℜn(a−n) = {˜fn(a−n, xn) ∈ ℜn(a−n)|‖̂fn(a−n, xn)‖2 ≤ εn} ,∀n ∈ Nf (11)
where εn is the bound of uncertainty region, and ‖.‖2 is the ellipsoid norm. The noisy observation is
considered as a new optimization parameter in the utility of each users [21]. The new utility function of
user n, considering the uncertainty, is un(an, f˜n), which satisfies
un(an, f˜n(a−n, xn))|εn=0 = vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)). (12)
Consequently, the followers’ optimization problem changes to
max
an∈An
min
f˜n(a−n,xn)∈ℜn(a−n)
un(an, f˜n(a−n, xn)), ∀n ∈ Nf (13)
The robust Nash Equilibrium (RNE) of this game by assuming the In = ∅ for all users, is defined [21],
[22] as a˜∗ = (a˜∗0, · · · , a˜∗N−1) iff,
min
f˜n(a∗−n,xn)∈ℜn(a−n)
un(a
∗
n, f˜n(a∗−n, xn)) ≥ min
f˜n(a∗−n,xn)∈ℜn(a−n)
un(an, f˜n(a∗−n, xn)) ∀an ∈ An. (14)
B. Incomplete information set
We refer to the leaders’ information set with uncertain parameters as an incomplete information set
where Xnfnl is the uncertain parameter. Note that obtaining this parameter is more challenging compared
to obtaing others parameters in communication systems. For example, in the power control games, the
follower’s transmitter sends the pilot signals to its receiver to estimate its direct channel gains. The leader
can extract Hnfnf by listening to the follower’s feedback channel. Also the leader can estimate Hnlnf
by listening to this pilot signal. Since there is no pilot signal from the follower’s receiver, the leader
cannot estimate Hnfnl . Following the worst-case approach, the uncertain information is considered as the
summation of its nominal value and the uncertain part which is bounded in the uncertainty region as
RXnfnl = {X˜nfnl |‖X̂nfnl‖2 = ‖X˜nfnl −Xnfnl‖2 ≤ δnfnl}, nf ∈ Nf , nl ∈ Nl. (15)
In contrast to the incomplete information set, we refer to the leader’s information set without uncertainty
as the complete information set.
9IV. ROBUST STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
Using the above definitions of uncertain parameters, we can defined different forms of RSG. In this
paper, we focus on two common scenarios:
Case 1: the leaders possess complete information sets, while the followers possess noisy observations;
Case 2: the leaders possess incomplete information sets and the followers possess noisy observations.
As an initial point to analyze the RSE, we first study the one leader-one follower scenario. Then the
extension of RSE for multi-followers and multiple-leaders is provided in Section VI.
A. Analysis of RSE for case 1
For this case, the leader’s information set is denote by IRSE10 as,
I
RSE1
0 = {(Am, vm,Xmn,Xmm,Xnm,ℜm(a−m))m6=n,∀m ∈ N}, (16)
Also the leader knows that the follower’s optimization problem is the same as (13). Therefore, the leader’s
bi-level optimization problem is
maxa0∈A0 v0(a0, f0(a1, x01)) (17)
subject to: maxan∈An min
f˜1∈ℜ1(a−1)
u1(a1, f˜1(a0, x10)).
If a˜∗1(a0) is the best response of (13) to the leader’s action, the RSE for case 1 is a∗RSE10 , defined as
v0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f˜0(a˜
∗
1(a
∗RSE1
0 ), x0)) ≥ v0(a0, f˜0(a˜
∗
1(a0), x0)), (18)
Remark 1: The RSE of case 1 exists since: 1) (13) is a concave with respect to a1(a0) for any fixed
action of the leader, and a decreasing function with respect to f1(a0, x1), 2) A1 and ℜ1(a−1) are two
convex bounded and disjoint sets. Consequently, there always exists a saddle point of (13) [23], which
is a solution to (13).
Now we characterize and compute the RSE, which is the most difficult part due to the computational
complexity of (17). In the following, for notational convenience, we omit the arguments of f1(a0, x1) and
f0(a0, x0).
Lemma 1: The uncertain observation for the follower’s optimization problem is equal to
f˜∗1 = f1 − ε1ϑ1 (19)
where f˜∗1 = [f˜1∗1 , · · · , f˜K∗1 ], ϑ1 = [ϑ11, · · · , ϑK1 ], and ϑk1 is defined as
ϑk1 =
∂uk
1
(a1 ,˜f1)
∂fk
1√∑K
k=1(
∂uk
1
(a1 ,˜f1)
∂fk
1
)2
, (20)
10
Proof: See Appendix A.
Using (19) in problem (17) removes the uncertainty region from the leader’s bi-level optimization
problem which is simplified as
max
a0∈A0
v0(a0, f0), ∀n ∈ N (21)
subject to: max
a1∈A1
v1(a1, f˜
∗
1),
By this reformulation, we can derive the difference between strategy of the leader and the follower in
RSE for case 1 and NSE.
Proposition 1: For the case 1 of RSG, the leader’s action is an increasing function and the follower’s
action is a decreasing function with respect to ε1, and they can be calculated as
a∗RSE11 = a
∗NSE
1 − ε1 × ((J1a1a1)−1J1a1f1 × ϑT1)T, (22)
a∗RSE10 = a
∗NSE
0 + ε1 × ((J0a0,a0)−1J0a0,f0X01(J1a1a1)−1J1a1f1 × ϑT1)T. (23)
where Jnfn,an = ∇fnanvn(an, fn) and Jnan,an = ∇2anvn(an, fn).
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Proposition 1, the solution to the robust problem (17) can be calculated based on the NSE and
the bound of uncertainty region in (22) and (23). Therefore, the computational complexity to solve (17) is
reduced. From (21) and Proposition 1, the variation of utilities of the leader and the follower are derived.
Proposition 2: For the case 1 of RSG, 1) for any realization of the follower’s noisy observation, we
have,
ω∗NSE0 ≤ ω
∗RSE1
0 , ω
∗RSE1
1 ≤ ω
∗NSE
1
where ω∗RSE1n is the achieved utility of player n in RSE for case 1. 2) The social utility of game increases
compared to NSG, i.e., ω˜∗RSE1 > ω∗NSE , if we have
C1 : |C10| < |J0a0 | ,C2 : |J1a1 | < |C01|,
where |q| is the absolute value of the elements of q.
Proof: See Appendix C.
From Proposition 2, uncertainty in the follower’s observation increases the leader’s utility. In contrast,
the follower achieves a smaller utility in RSE for case 1 compared to NSE. Interestingly, the social utility
at the RSE increases compared to NSE if C1 and C2 hold. C1 and C2 can be interpret as follows: the
negative impact of the leader to the follower is less than the leader’s direct rate and the follower’s direct
11
rate is less than its negative impact on the leader. Correspondingly, the increase in the leader’s utility is
larger than the decrease of the follower’s utility where the leader’s strategy increases and the follower’s
strategy decreases and, as a result, the social utility increases.
B. Analysis of RSE for case 2
For case 2, we denote the leader’s incomplete information set as I˜RSE20 which is equivalent to
I˜
RSE2
0 = {(Am, vm, X˜mn,Xmm,Xnm,ℜm(a−m))m6=n,∀m ∈ N}, (24)
where X˜10 is uncertain parameter with uncertainty region as (15). Using the concept of worst-case
optimization, the leader’s bi-level optimization problem is changed to
max
a0∈A0
min
X˜10∈RX10
v0(a0, f0) (25)
subject to: max
a1∈A1
min
f1∈R1
u1(a1, f1).
According to (25), the leader cannot evaluate precisely its impact on the follower. Note that, 1) the f1
is a linear function of X10, and 2) the leader considers the worst-case condition of information in the
uncertainty region to obtain the solution of follower, therefore:
A5: for case 2, the negative impact of the leader on the follower is a decreasing function with respect
to δ10 i.e., ∇δ10f1 < 0.
Remark 2: The RSE in case 2 always exists, because: 1) RX10 , R1, A0, and A1 are compact and
closed sets, 2) for any realization of X˜10 ∈ RX10 , R1 is closed and convex. Consequently, for any value
of the leader’s uncertain information and strategy, the follower has a feasible strategy.
While the existence condition of RSE for case 2 can be shown easily, solving problem (25) is
significantly more complex compared to (17). In the following, we will discuss about the relationship
between the RSE for case 2 with the RSE for case 1 and NSE.
Proposition 3: The leader’s utility at RSE in case 2 is always less than the leader’s utility for case 1
namely, ω∗RSE20 ≤ ω∗RSE10 , where ω∗RSE2n is the achieved utility of nth user in the RSE of case 2.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 shows that the leader’s incomplete information set always decreases the leader’s utility
compared to case 1. Next we compare the leader’s and follower’s utility in the RSE for case 2 to that of
the NSE.
Proposition 4: For case 2 of RSG: 1) The leader’s strategy is a decreasing function with respect to
δ10 and the follower’s strategy is an increasing function with respect to δ10, 2) for all realizations of the
12
leader’s incomplete information set, we have
ω∗RSE20 ≤ ω
∗NSE
0 , ω
∗NSE
1 ≤ ω
∗RSE2
1
3) the social utility of game increases compared to the NSG i.e., ω∗RSE2 ≥ ω∗NSE , if
C3 : |J0a0 | < |C10| ,C4 : |J1a1 | > |C01|.
Proof: Appendix E.
According to Proposition 4, uncertainty in the leader’s information set always decreases the leader’s
utility compared to NSE. In contrast, the follower reaches a higher utility compared to the NSE. In this
case, if the follower’s direct rate is greater than its negative impact on the leader (i.e., C3), and the
leader’s direct rate is less than its negative impact on the follower (i.e., C4), the social utility at RSE for
case 2 increases compared to that at NSE.
An interesting interpretation arises when comparing C1 with C3 and C2 with C4. These comparisons
indicate that C1-C2 are the dual of C3-C4. In case 1, a higher social utility can be achieved if the increase
of the leader’s utility is higher than the decares of the follower’s utility. In contrast, in case 2, the higher
utility can be achieved if the increase of the follower’s utility is higher than the decrease of the leader’s
utility. The variations of utilities of the leader and the follower at RSE compared to NSE for case 1 and
2 are summarized in Table I.
We should note that the implementation of above scenarios in practice does not need the synchronization
between leader and follower. For example if the follower plays first, the leader chooses its action based
on its information set without considering the follower’s action. Then the follower observes the leader’s
impact and plays based on its observation. Therefore, always the actions of the leader and the follower
converge to the NSE and the RSE regardless of synchronization between them.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we validate the above results in the power control game and simplify C1-C4 based
on channel gains between users. In the power control games, the information set for case 1 equals
to IRSE10 = {(Am, vm, H˜mn,Hmm,Hnm,ℜm(a−m))m6=n,∀m ∈ N}. For case 1, the solution of the
follower’s optimization based on the uncertainty is
f˜∗k1 = f
k
1 + ε1 ×
ak
1
Hk
11
σk
1
+ak
0
Hk
01√
(
∑K
k=1
ak
1
Hk
11
σk
1
+ak
0
Hk
01
)2
, ∀k ∈ K, (26)
First, to illustrate all the results obtained in Proposition 2 and 4, we simulate a single carrier power
control using the simulation parameters of the first row in Table II. Fig. 2 shows the variation of utilities
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of the follower and the leader on the Pareto boundary of the power control game. By increasing ε1, the
leader’s utility increases as we expected from Proposition 2. In contrast by increasing the value of δ10,
the follower’s utility increases and the value of the leader’s utility decreases based on Proposition 4.
To provide practical insight into the C1 and C2, we want to express these conditions for power control
games only in terms of channel gains. The exact expressions of C1 and C2 for power control game are
C1 for power control games : H
k
10H
k
11a
k
1
fk1 × (f
k
1 +H
k
11a
k
1)
<
Hk00
fk0 +H
k
00a
k
0
, ∀k ∈ K, (27)
C2 for power control games : H
k
01H
k
00a
k
0
fk0 × (f
k
0 +H
k
00a
k
0)
>
Hk11
fk1 +H
k
11a
k
1
, ∀k ∈ K. (28)
To simplify the above conditions, we consider three scenarios based on signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) of the leader and the follower as: R1) High SINR scenario i.e., Hk00ak0 ≫ Hk01ak1 + σk0 and
Hk11a
k
1 ≫ H
k
10a
k
0 + σ
k
1 in which C1 and C2 are simplified to
Hk10 < H
k
01, (29)
R2) Low SINR scenario i.e., Hk00ak0 ≪ Hk01ak1 + σk0 and Hk11ak1 ≪ Hk10ak0 + σk1 , where the social utility
increases if
Hk00 > H
k
01 and Hk11 < Hk10, (30)
and, R3) Moderate SINR scenario, i.e., where the values of induced interference of the leader and the
follower to each other are close, i.e., fk1 ≈ fk0 . Therefore, C1 and C2 change to
Hk00
Hk01
>
Hk11a
k
1
Hk10a
k
0 + σ
k
1
,
Hk11
Hk10
<
Hk00a
k
0
Hk01a
k
1 + σ
k
0
∀k ∈ K,
The above conditions are simplified by assuming that channel noise is much less than the interference
from other users, e.g., Hk10ak0 ≫ σk1 , and the power transmissions of the leader and the follower are close,
as
Hk00H
k
10 > H
k
11H
k
10 ∀k ∈ K. (31)
Using (29)-(31), we can predict how the social utility increases or decreases under given channel
conditions for case 1. To provide insight about implementing the Stackelberg game in the interference
channels, we investigate the effect of these conditions on the amount of decrease and increase of the
leader’s utility and follower’s utility. Consider dRSE1n =
ωRSE1n −ω
NSE
n
ωNSEn
to show the percentage of change of
utility of player n in RSE for case 1 compared to NSE, and dRSE1 = ωRSE1−ωNSE
ωNSE
as percentage of change
of social utility of RSE for case 1 compared to NSE. A larger value of dRSE1n indicates a larger increase
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of utility of player n in case 1. The same notation for case 2 will be applied as dRSE2n =
ωRSE2n −ω
NSE
n
ωNSEn
and dRSE2 = ωRSE2−ωNSE
ωNSE
for user n and social utility, respectively.
In Figs. 3 (a), (b) and (c), we depict dRSE10 , dRSE11 and dRSE1 for R1, R2, and R3, respectively.
Increasing the leader’s utility and decreasing the follower’s utility are evident with respect to ε1 as
expected from Proposition 2. When (29)- (31) are satisfied, the social utility increases as shown in Fig. 3
(a), (b), and (c). In contrast, when (29)- (31) are not satisfied, the social utility decreases compared to NSE
as depicted in Figs. 3 (e), (f) and (g). However, in R1, the increase of social utility is not considerable if
(29) holds. In R2 and R3, when (30) and (31) are satisfied, the leader’s utility and social utility increase
considerably. For example, when (30) does not hold, dRSE10 reduces from 220% in Fig. 3. (b) to 40% in
Fig. 3. (e), and dRSE1 decreases from 100% to around −1%. Therefore, both of the accurate information
set of leader and holding the (30) are valuable from leader and system. The same is true for R3.
For case 2, the uncertain parameter is H10. For the above regions, C3 and C4 change to
R1: =⇒ Hk10 > Hk01 (32)
R2: =⇒ Hk00 < Hk01, Hk11 > Hk10 (33)
R3: =⇒ Hk00Hk10 < Hk11Hk10∀k. (34)
The effects of enlarging the value of δ01 in dRSE20 , dRSE21 and dRSE2 are investigated in Figs. 4 (a)-(f).
As we expected from Proposition 4, the leader’s utilities in all the cases decrease compared to that at
the NSE, while the follower’s utility increases by increasing the value of δ01. In Figs. 4 (a), (b), and
(c), conditions (32)-(34) do not hold. Consequently, the social utility decreases. In contrast, in Figs. 4.
(d), (e), and (f), the social utility increases by increasing δ10 because (32)-(34) hold. Fig. 4 (a) and 4 (d)
show that dRSE21 decreases from 1.5% to 1% when (32) holds compare to the case it dose not hold. The
same decreasing is observable by comparing dRSE21 in Figs 4 (b) and 4 (e) and Fig. 4 (c) and (f). These
comparisons indicate that in all the regions, the follower obtains a lower utility when (32)-(34) hold and
the social utility increases insignificantly.
A. Practical remarks
Comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 shows that the leader’s utility and social utility increase significantly for
case 1. In contrast for case 2, the social utility has lower rate of increase. Also the follower’s utility
increases insignificantly. For example, in R2, in case 1 the leader’s utility and social utility increase up to
200%, while for case 2, the follower’s utility and social utility increases up to 10% in R2. Therefore, the
leader’s complete information set is more effective in increasing the social utility. This analysis provides
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incentives for the system designer to build more efficient protocols to collect the accurate information for
the leader. Also these results help in designing systems with two or more leaders. Consider that leaders
want to increase their social utility and they encounter uncertainty in their parameters. If (29)- (31) hold
for one of them and it has a complete information, it plays as a leader and the others play as followers.
Therefore the social utility of leaders increases considerably.
B. Power control with maximum transmit power constraints
Consider that the sum of powers of each player over all subchannels is limited by Pmaxn , i.e.,
K∑
k=1
akn ≤ P
max
n . (35)
In this case, the players’ strategies are nonlinear functions with respect to their observations [3], [24].
Therefore, we cannot use Propositions 1-4 directly. To investigate the performance of RSE with (35), we
show the allocated power over different subchannels in Figs. 5-7. The corresponding leader’s utility and
follower’s utility are summarized in Table III. The simulation parameters are the same as in Figs. 3 - 4
in Table II except Pmaxn = amaxnk = 200 dB.
Consider KNSEn ⊆ K and KRSE1n ⊆ K as the sets of subchannels utilized by user n at the NSE and RSE
for case 1, respectively. Also we define LNSEnm = KNSEn ∩ KNSEm and LRSE1nm = KRSE1n ∩KRSE1m as the
set of common subchannels between user m and user n at the NSE and the RSE for case 1, respectively.
According of the simulation results in Figs. 5-7, we have |LRSE101 | < |LNSE01 |, where |LRSE101 | and |LNSE01 |
are the size of LRSE101 and LNSE01 , respectively. For example, |LRSE101 | = 17 and |LNSE01 | = 13 in R1
and |LRSE101 | = 0 and |LNSE01 | = 1 in R2. As we expected and seen in Table III, the leader’s utility
increases for case 1 in all conditions. Interestingly, in R2, the follower’s utility also increases compared
to NSE. Since the number of common subchannels decrease, there is less interference from the leader to
the follower and viceversa at RSE for case 1 compared to NSE. Therefore, as shown in Table II, there
is a probability that the leader’s utility and follower’s utility increase simultaneously.
To quantify this probability, we show the simulated cumulative distributed function (cdf) of dRSE11
for 3 situations of high interference scenarios between the leader and the follower as: S1) the leader’s
interference to the follower is high, e.g., H
k
10
Hk
11
> 0.8, but the follower’s interference to the leader is low,
e.g., H
k
01
Hk
00
< 0.1; S2) the leader’s and the follower’s interference are high to each other, e.g., Hk10
Hk
11
> 0.9
and H
k
01
Hk
00
> 0.9; S3) the follower’s interference to the leader is high; e.g., Hk10
Hk
11
< 0.1; but for the leader
to the follower is low, e.g., H
k
01
Hk
00
> 0.9.
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From the simulated curves in Fig. 8, when both the interference from the leader to the follower and the
follower to the leader are large, i.e., in S2 there is no probability for the follower to reach a higher utility
compared to NSE. In contrast, in S1 and S3, there is a probability that the follower’s utility increases
e.g., around 0.1. Therefore, the leader and the follower reach higher utilities when there is uncertainty in
the follower’s observations with power constraint in (35) which is an opportunistic phenomena of RSG
in case 1 in terms of increasing utility of both leader and follower.
VI. EXTENSION TO MULTI-USER GAME
The pervious results can be extended for multiple-leaders and multiple-followers in the Stackelberg
game. Obviously, analysis of RSE in this scenario is more challenging [25]–[27]. In order to do that, we
focuss on the case that the NE of game of followers is unique.
A. One leader and multiple-followers (Nl = 1 and Nf > 1)
For this scenario there is only one leader in the Stackelberg game denoted with the index 0. Consider
the Nf ×Nf matrix Υ by following elements
[Υ]nm =

 α
min
n if m = n, m, n ∈ Nf
−βmaxnm if m 6= n, m, n ∈ Nf
where
αn(a) , smallest eigenvalue of −∇2anvn(an, fn) α
min
n , inf
a∈A
αn(a) ∀n ∈ Nf (36)
βnm(a) , ‖ −∇anamvn(an, fn)‖ ∀n 6= m βmaxnm , sup
a∈A
βn(a) ∀n ∈ Nf (37)
If Υ is a P -matrix, the NE between followers is unique (Theorem 12.5, [28]).
1) Case 1 of RSE: In this case, the followers’ observations are uncertain parameters which are modeled
as (11). In contrast, the leader has the complete information set. For each follower, the optimization
problem is similar to (13) and the reformulations to (20) can be applied as
f˜∗n = fn − εnϑn, n ∈ Nf (38)
where f˜∗n = [f˜1∗n , · · · , f˜K∗n ], ϑn = [ϑ1n, · · · , ϑKn ], and
ϑkn =
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂fkn√∑K
k=1(
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂fkn
)2
. (39)
Proposition 5: For case 1 of RSG, if Υ is a P -matrix; 1) the followers’ strategies are decreasing functions
with respect to ε = [ε1, · · · , εN ] and the social utility of followers’ game is less than that of the NSE;
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2) the leader’s utility at RSE is higher than that at the NSE; 3) the social utility increases compared to
NSE if
C5 : J0a0 >
∑
n∈Nf
Cn0 , C6 : Jnan < C0n +
∑
m6=n,m∈Nf
Cmn, ∀n ∈ Nf .
Proof: See Appendix F.
The same as in Proposition 2, the followers’ noisy observations increase the leader’s utility. In contrast,
they decrease the followers’ utilities. The social utility increases in RSE compared to that at NSE, if the
leader’s direct rate is larger than its negative impact on the followers i.e., C5, and, for each follower,
its negative impacts on the other followers and the leader are greater than on its direct rate i.e., C6.
Therefore under these conditions, decreasing the follower’s actions has more effect to increase of the
leader’s utility and the other followers’ utilities compared to decrease of its utility. Also, increase of the
leader’s action has more effect to increase of its utilities compared to decrease of the followers’ utilities.
2) Case 2: In this case, we assume that Xn0 is uncertain parameter and the leader considerers the
uncertainty region with boundary δn0 for each follower as
RXn0 = {X˜n0 | ‖X̂n0‖2 = ‖X˜n0 −Xn0‖2 ≤ δn0}, ∀n ∈ Nf . (40)
Proposition 6: For case 2, if Υ is a P -matrix, 1) the leader’s utility is always less than that of the NSE;
2) the followers’ actions are increasing functions with respect to δ0 = [δ10, · · · , δNf ,0], and the social
utility of the followers’ game is higher than that of the NSE; 3) the social utility increases if
C7 : J0a0 <
∑
n∈Nf
Cn0, C8 : Jnan > C0n +
∑
m6=n,m∈Nf
Cmn,∀n ∈ Nf .
Proof: See Appendix G.
Again, the leader’s incomplete information set decreases the leader’s utility and increases the social
utility of followers. Also from C7-C8, if the leader’s direct rate is less than its negative impact on the
followers and negative impacts of each follower on the other followers and the leader are less than of its
direct rate, the social utility of RSE for case 2 increases compared to NSE. Besides, C5- C6, and C7-C8
are dual.
For multiple-followers and one leader scenario, the hierarchy between the leader and followers still
remains. To implement this scenario in a distributed manner, the leader announces its action first. Then,
all the followers play the strategic non-cooperative robust game. The robust game between followers can
be implemented using a distributed algorithm as in [21].
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B. Multiple-leaders and Multiple-followers: Nl > 1 and Nf > 1
In this scenario, the definition of RSG and RSE is not unique. There are different forms of NSG
for multiple-leaders and multiple-followers scenario based on interaction among the leaders such as
cooperation or competition [2], [26]. For example, one of the possible way to define the Stackelberg
game with multiple-followers is to consider cooperation between leaders when all leaders know each
other and try to maximize their social utility as
maxan∈An
∑
n∈Nl
vn(an, fn) (41)
subject to max
am∈Am
vm(am, fm) ∀m ∈ Nf ,
Proposition 7: If Υ is a P-matrix for the game of followers, leaders’ social utility increases for case 1
of RSE.
Proof: See Appendix H.
In this scenario, the major concern is the analysis of case 2. Since (41) is a non-convex and non-smooth
optimization problem, deriving the conditions for increasing or decreasing the aggregate of leaders’
utilities (41) is impossible. Nevertheless, a heuristic protocol to increase the social utility of followers
and some of the leaders is proposed based on the results of this paper in section IV. This protocol is
summarized in Table IV. Briefly, in this protocol, the leader with the highest negative impact on the
followers and the other leaders and the less internal rate is chosen to play as the leader and all the others
leaders and followers are considered as the followers. Therefore, the social utility of game among the
followers and the remaining leaders increases with respect to the leader’s incomplete information set
based on Proposition 6.
In Table V, we evaluate the performance of heuristic algorithm where there are two leaders and only
one follower in power control game. In SNE, both of the leaders maximize their sum of utility based on
(41). When the information of leaders are subject to uncertainty, leader 1 acts as the leader and leader
2 as the follower. In this case, the uncertainty in the leaders causes the decreasing utilities of both of
the leaders, while the utility of follower increases. However, the social utility of the follower and the
leader 2 increases for the case 2 of RSE with heuristic algorithm. Clearly, the above heuristic algorithm
does not guarantee to increase the leader’s social utility. However, it guarantees that social utility over
all players excepts player nl increases for case 2 of RSE.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the robust Stackelberg equilibrium for communication systems under
different types of uncertainty. We derive that the followers’ uncertain information increases the leaders’
utilities while decreasing the followers’ utilities and the leaders’ uncertain information increases the
followers’ utilities while decreasing the leaders’ utilities. We show that the social utility in case 1 increases
if the increasing rates of the leaders’ utilities are larger than the decreasing rates of the followers’ utilities.
In contrast, in case 2, if the decreasing rates of the leaders’ utilities are less than the increasing rates of
the followers’ utilities, the social utility increases. For power control games, we simplify these general
conditions based on the channel gains between transmitter and receivers in different SINR scenarios and
provide insights on how to design enhanced protocol for gathering the leaders’ information and implement
high-efficient systems in the multiple-leaders communication scenario. These results can be extended to
other communication systems to gain insights on how to implement the RSE and NSE.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since u1(a1, f1) is convex with respect to f1, the internal optimization problem of the follower in (17)
can be solved as
L(a1, f˜1, λ) =
K∑
k=1
uk1(a
k
1 , f˜
k
1 ) + λ(
K∑
k=1
(f˜k1 − f
k
1 )
2 − ε21), (42)
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where λ is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier that satisfies (11), i.e.,
λ× (ε21 −
K∑
k=1
(f˜k1 − f
k
1 )
2) = 0. (43)
The solution of (42) according to f˜k1 can be obtained by optimality condition of optimization problem
without constraint [29], i.e., ∂L(a1,f˜1,λ)
∂f˜k
1
= 0, which is equivalent to
∂uk1(a
k
1 , f˜
k
1 )
∂f˜k1
= −2λ× (f˜k1 − f
k
1 ) ∀k ∈ K. (44)
If the above solution is inserted in (43), the uncertain parameter is obtained as (19).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
1) At the RSE, the first order optimality condition holds for the follower’s optimization problem as,
∇a∗RSE1
1
u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f∗RSE11 ) = 0, (45)
where f∗RSE11 is derived by a∗RSE10 . The derivative of (45) with respect to ε1 is
[∇2a∗RSE1
1
u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f∗RSE11 )∇ε1a∗RSE11 +∇a∗RSE11 f∗RSE11 u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f∗RSE11 )∇ε1f∗RSE11 ]ε1=0 = 0. (46)
If ε1 = 0, the u1(a∗RSE11 , f∗RSE1 ) is equal to v1(a∗NSE1 , f∗NSE1 ), where f∗NSE1 is obtained by a∗NSE0 .
Also, from (19), the last term of left hand side of (46) is equal to −ϑT1 . Therefor, by rearrangement of
(46), we have
∇ε1a
∗RSE1
1 = (J1a1a1)−1J1a1f1 × ϑT1 . (47)
From A1, A2, and A3, the right hand side of (47) is negative, hence ∇ε1a∗RSE11 < 0. Therefore, the
follower’s action is the decreasing function with respect to ε1. 2) In the RSE case 1, the first order
condition holds for utility of leader with respect to a∗RSE11 as
∇a∗RSE1
0
u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE10 ) = 0. (48)
The derivative of (48) according to ε1 is
[∇2a∗RSE1
0
u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE10 )×∇ε1a∗RSE10 +
∇a∗RSE1
0
f∗RSE1
0
u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE10 )× X01 ×∇ε1a∗RSE11 ]ε1=0 = 0, (49)
which is equivalent to
∇ε1a
∗RSE1
0 = −(J0a0,a0)−1J0a0,f0X01∇ε1a∗RSE11 . (50)
From A1- A3, the right hand side of (50) is positive. Therefore, we have ∇ε1a∗RSE10 > 0. Hence, the
leaders’ action is an increasing function with respect to ε1.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
1) The Taylor series of the leader’s utility around the uncertain parameter is
u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE0 ) = v0(a∗NSE0 , f∗NSE0 )+ (51)
ε1[(X01∇f∗RSE1
0
u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE10 ))T∇ε1a∗RSE11 + (∇a∗RSE10 u0(a
∗RSE1
0 , f∗RSE10 )))T∇ε1a∗RSE10 ]ε1=0 + o,
Note that in the following proves, we consider the first term of Tailor series and ignore higher terms
because 1) fn is a linear function of a−n and its higher order derivatives are equal to zero; 2) un is a
concave function of an and the second order derivative is negative, 3) the value of higher order terms
is very small values because of higher exponents of ε1. From A2 and ∇ε1a∗RSE11 < 0, the first part of
(51) is always positive. Also, the second term has only positive elements. Therefore, the utility of leader
is always larger than to that of NSE in the case 1. By some rearrangements, we have
ω∗RSE10 − ω
∗NSE
0 ≈ ε1((J0a0)T∇ε1a∗RSE10 + (X10J0f0)T∇ε1a∗RSE11 ). (52)
2) Again, we start with the Taylor series of the follower’s utility around ε1 as
u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f∗RSE11 ) = v1(a∗NSE1 , f∗NSE1 )+ (53)
ε1[(X01∇f∗RSE1
1
u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f
∗RSE1
1 ))
T∇ε1a
∗RSE1
0 + (∇a∗RSE11 u1(a
∗RSE1
1 , f
∗RSE1
1 ))
T ×∇ε1a
∗RSE1
1 ]ε1=0 + o,
In this case, the first term of the Taylor series is always negative, since∇f1v1(a1, f1) < 0 and∇ε1a∗RSE10 >
0. Also, ∇a1v1(a1, f1) > 0 and ∇ε1a∗RSE11 < 0. Consequently, the second term is negative. Hence, the
follower’s utility at RSE for case 1 is always less than the utility at NSE. By some rearrangement, we
have
ω∗RSE11 − ω
∗NSE
1 ≈ ε1 × ((X01J1f1)T∇ε1a∗RSE10 + (J1a1)T∇ε1a∗RSE11 ). (54)
3) The social utility of RSE for case 1 increases if
ωRSE10 − ω
∗NSE
0 + ω
∗RSE1
1 − ω
∗NSE
1 > 0. (55)
Because ∇ε1a∗RSE11 < 0 and ∇ε1a∗RSE10 > 0, (55) leads to
J0a0 + X01J1f1 > 0, J1a1 + X10J0f0 < 0, (56)
The above conditions are equal to C1 and C2.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From incomplete information set, the leader cannot calculate the exact value of a1. Therefore, the value
of f0 is uncertain. Consequently, the RSE of case 2 can be considered as ǫ Stackelberg strategy space for
case 1 (definition 4.7 of [1]). Since the leader’s utility is continuous ( from A1 and A2), there always
exists a positive value i.e. ς > 0, where ω∗RSE10 − ω∗RSE20 ≤ ς (Property 4.2 of [1]) and this difference
is concinnous (Property 4.3 of [1]).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
1) To obtain ωRSE20 − ωNSE0 , we first derive the ∇f∗RSE21 a∗RSE21 . From the first order optimality
condition as J1a1 = 0 at a∗RSE21 , we have
J1a1a1∇f∗RSE21 a
∗RSE2
1 + J1a1f1 = 0, (57)
Consequently, we have ∇f∗RSE2
1
a∗RSE21 = −(J1a1a1)−1J1a1f1 which is always negative. ∇δ10a∗RSE21 is equal
to
∇δ10a
∗RSE2
1 = ∇f∗RSE2
1
a∗RSE21 ∇δ10f∗RSE21 , (58)
From A5, (58) is always positive. Therefore, the follower’s action is an increasing function of δ10. The
Taylor series of u1(a∗RSE2, f∗RSE21 ) around δ10 is
u1(a
∗RSE2, f∗RSE21 ) = v1(a∗NSE , f∗NSE1 ) + δ10 × [
∂u1(a
∗RSE2
1 , f∗RSE21 )
∂δ10
]δ10=0,ε1=0 + o, (59)
where
∂u1(a
∗RSE2
1 , f∗RSE21 )
∂δ10
=
(∇a∗RSE2
1
u1(a
∗RSE2
1 , f∗RSE21 ))T∇f∗RSE21 a
∗RSE2
1 ∇δ10f
∗RSE2
1 +
(∇f∗RSE2
1
u(a∗RSE21 , f∗RSE21 ))T∇δ10f∗RSE21 , (60)
and it is simplified to
ωRSE21 − ω
NSE
1 ≈ ((J1a1)TJ1a1,f1(J1a1,a1)−1 − (J1f1)T)∇δ10f∗RSE21 , (61)
from A1 - A5, the follower’s utility increases with respect to δ10 compared to that the NSE. 2) We start
with J0a1 = 0 to derive the ∇a∗RSE21 a∗RSE20 as,
J0a0a0∇a∗RSE21 a
∗RSE2
0 + X01J0a0f0 = 0. (62)
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Also, the Taylor series around the uncertain information is
v0(a
∗RSE2
0 , f∗RSE20 ) = v0(a∗NSE0 , f∗RSE20 ) + δ10 × [
∂v0(a
∗RSE2
0 , f∗RSE20 )
∂δ10
]δ10=0 + o, (63)
where
∂v0(a
∗RSE2
0 , f∗RSE20 )
∂δ10
=
(∇a∗RSE2
0
v0(a
∗RSE2
0 , f∗RSE20 ))T∇a∗RSE21 a
∗RSE2
0 ∇δ10a
∗RSE2
1 +
(∇f0v0(a
∗RSE2
0 , f0))TX01∇δ10a1 + o, (64)
By inserting (62) and (58) in (64), we have
ωRSE20 − ω
NSE
0 ≈ δ10 × [−(J0a0)TJ0a0,f0X01(J0a0,a0)−1 + (J0f0)TX01]∇δ10a1, (65)
which is always negative from A1-A5. Now we want to derive the conditions for increasing the social
utility. Since ∇a∗RSE2
1
a∗RSE20 ×∇δ10a
∗RSE2
0 < 0, to increase the social utility, the sum of second terms
in right hand side of (60) and the first term in right hand side of (64) should be negative as
|J0a0 | − |J1f1 | × |X10| < 0, (66)
Since ∇δ10a∗RSE21 > 0, the sum of first term in right hand side of (60) and the second term in right hand
side of (64) should be positive to increase the social utility as
|J1a1 | − |J0f0 | × |X01| > 0. (67)
Clearly, (67) and (66) lead to C3 and C4.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Lemma 2: If Υ is a P matrix, the followers’ strategies are decreasing functions with respect to
ε = [ε1, · · · , εNf ].
Proof: Assume that the followers’ strategies i.e., aNf = [a1, · · · , aNf ], are increasing functions of
ε, i.e.,
aRSE1Nf ≥ a
NSE
Nf , (68)
If Υ is a P -matrix, J (aNf ) = (Jnan(an))
Nf
n=1 is strictly monotone ( Corollary 2.6.4 in [28]). The
equilibrium of the followers’ game is a solution of V I(
∏Nf
n=1An × Rn,J ) [21], then,
(aRSE1Nf − a
NSE
Nf )J (a
NSE
Nf ) ≤ 0 (69)
(aNSENf − a
RSE
Nf )J (a
NSE
Nf ) ≤ 0 (70)
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by substituting (69) from (70) and considering (68), we have
J (aRSE1Nf ) > J (a
NSE
Nf ), (71)
From (38),
∂ukn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂akn
=
∂vkn(a
k
n, f˜
k∗
n )
∂akn
+
∂vkn
∂f˜k∗n
×
∂f˜k∗n
∂akn
, (72)
and
∂f˜k∗n
∂akn
=
∂f˜k∗n
∂ϑkn
×
∂ϑkn
∂akn
= −ε1 ×
∂2vkn(an, f˜
∗
1 )
∂aknf˜
k
1
× (
K∑
k=1
(
∂uk1(a1, f˜1)
∂fk1
)2)−
1
2 , (73)
From a˜kn = −ε1 ×
∂vkn
∂f˜k∗n
× ∂
2vkn(an,f˜
∗
1
)
∂aknf˜
k
1
× (
∑K
k=1(
∂uk
1
(a1 ,˜f1)
∂fk
1
)2)−
1
2 which is negative according to A1-A3,
(73) is equal to
J (aRSE1Nf )−J (a
NSE
Nf ) = a˜ < 0, (74)
where a˜ = (a˜n)Nfn=1, a˜
T
n = [a˜
1
n, · · · , a˜
K
n ] which is contradict with (71). This contradiction implies that
our assumption is wrong. Therefore, the followers’ actions in the Robust Stackelberg game case 1 are
decreasing functions with respect to ε.
1) Since the followers’ strategies are decreasing functions of ε, the value of f0 decreases which implies
vRSE10 ≥ v
NSE
0 from A2. Consider the variation of the leader’s action with respect to the bound of
uncertainty region of all followers as ∇εa0. The Taylor series of vRSE10 around ε is
vRSE10 ≈ v
NSE
0 + [(∇εa0)
TJna0 +
Nf∑
n=1
εn × [X0nJ0f0(∇εnan)T] + o. (75)
2) The RNE of the followers in multiple-followers of RSG in Section V belongs to Robust additively
coupled game introduced in [21]. Based on Theorem 2 of [21], the social utilities of the followers at
RSE is less than that at NSG, if Γ is P matrix. The Taylor series around ε is
vRSE1n ≈ v
NSE
n + εn × [(Jnfn)TXn0∇εa0 +
Nf∑
m=1,m6=n
Xnm∇εmam + (Jnan)T∇εnan] + o. (76)
3) The social utility at RSE case 1 increases, if the summation of (75) and (76) is positive. Therefore
the terms multiplied by ∇εna0 should be positive because ∇εa0 > 0. Since ∇εnan < 0, its multiplied
terms should be negative. These two conditions leads to C5 and C6 by some rearrangements.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Lemma 3: If Υ is a P matrix, the followers’ strategies are increasing functions with respect to
δ0 = [δ10, · · · , δNf ,0].
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Proof: Assume the follower’s strategies i.e., a˜Nf = [a1, · · · , aNf ], are the decreasing functions of
δ0. Therefore, we have a˜RSE2Nf ≤ a˜
NSE
. If Υ is a P matrix, J (aNf ) = (Jnan(an))
Nf
n=1 is strictly monotone
( Theorem 12.5 in [28]), and we have,
J (aRSE2Nf ) ≤ J (a
NSE
Nf ) (77)
Now, from the Taylor series of the followers’ utilities round δ0, we have
∂ukn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂akn
=
∂vkn(a
k
n, f˜
k∗
n )
∂akn
+
∂vkn
∂f˜k∗n
×
∂f˜k∗n
∂δn0
, (78)
from A5, the last term of (78) is positive. Therefore
J (aRSE2Nf )−J (a
NSE
Nf ) = b˜ > 0 (79)
where b˜ = (b˜n)Nfn=1 and kth elements of b˜n is equal to the last term of (78). From (64), J (aRSE2Nf ) ≥
J (aNSENf ) which is contradict with (77). Therefore the followers’ strategies are increasing functions with
respect to δ0.
1) If the followers’ actions are increasing functions of δ0, the value of f0 increases. Since v0 is a
decreasing function of f0, the leader’s utility is a decreasing function with respect to δ0. By using the
Taylor series, we have
vNSE20 ≈ v
NSE
0 +
∑
n∈Nf
δn0 × ((J0f0)TX0n∇δn0an) + (J0a0)T∇δn0a0) + o. (80)
2) Assume that the followers’ utilities are decreasing functions with respect to δ0. In this case, the
followers’ strategies are decreasing functions with respect to δ0. This is because Jna is strong monotone
when Υ is P-matrix. However, this is contradict with Lemma 3. Therefore, the followers’ utilities are
increasing function with respect to δ0. Consequently, the social utility of game converges to the higher
utility. Besides, the Taylor series of each follower’s utility around δn0 is
vRSE2n ≈ v
NSE
n + δn0× [(Jnfn)TXn0∇δ0na0+(Jnfn)T(
∑
m6=n,m∈Nf
Xnm∇δm0am)+ (Jnan)T∇δ0nan]+ o. (81)
3) The social utility of RSE2 increases compared to that at the NSE, if the summation of second part of
Taylor series in (75) and (81) are positive. In this case, ∇δn0a0 < 0 and ∇δn0an > 0, therefore the terms
related to the ∇δ0a0 should be negative, and the terms related to ∇δn0an should be positive. By some
rearrangements, the C7 and C8 are obtained.
27
Case of robust game Leader Follower The social utility increases if
case 1 ωRSE10 ≥ ωNSE0 ωRSE11 ≤ ωNSE1 |J0a0 | > |C10| , |J1a1 | < |C01|
case 2 ωRSE20 ≤ ωNSE0 ωRSE21 ≥ ωNSE1 |J0a0 | < |C10|, |J1a1 | > |C01|
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS 2 AND 4.
Number of Fig Nl Nf K Hkmn amaxnk aminnk σkn for all k
2 1 1 1 A Rayleigh model [3] 10 dB 0 0.01
3-4 1 1 20 A four-ray Rayleigh model [3] 10 dB 0 0.01
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR POWER CONTROL GAMES
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
By introducing robustness in the followers’ optimization problems, their strategies at the RSE decrease
[Theorem 2 in [21]]. Consequently, the followers’ impacts on the leaders decrease, and the leaders’
utilities increase. Therefore, the leaders’ social utility increases.
Fig. 1. Illustrative example: power control games in interference channels.
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Fig. 3. Validating Proposition 2 with the numerical example of power control. (a) in R1 and (29) holds (b) in R2 and (30)
holds, (c) in R3 and (31) holds, (d) in R1 and (29) does not hold (e) in R2 and (30) does not hold, (g) in R3 and (31) does not
hold.
Different scenarios based on SINR R1 R2 R3
achieved utility for case 1 RSE NSE d% RSE NSE d% RSE NSE d%
leader 92.17 71.95 28.1% 110.11 105.71 4.2% 156.01 119.89 30.13%
Follower 53.47 70.84 −24.5% 97.67 95.94 1.8% 50.15 96.55 −48.06%
TABLE III
THE LEADER’S AND THE FOLLOWER’S UTILITY SUBJECT TO (35).
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Fig. 4. Validating Proposition 4 with power control games. (a) in R1 and (32) does not hold, (b) in R2 and (33) does not
hold, (c) in R3 and (34) does not hold, (d) in R1 and (32) holds, (e) in R2 and (33) holds, (g) in R3 and (34) holds.
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Fig. 5. Power allocation of the follower and the leader in R1 subject to (35) (a) at NSE and (b) at RSE for case 1.
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Fig. 6. Power allocation of the follower and the leader in R2 subject to (35) (a) at NSE and (b) at RSE for case 1.
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Fig. 7. Power allocation of the follower and the leader in R2 subject to (35) (a) at NSE and (b) at RSE for case 1.
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Heuristic protocol for multiple-leaders and multiple-followers
Start nl = 1 and nl ∈ Nl,
Consider Nnewnf = {1, ..., nl−1, nl+1, ..., Nl}
⋃
Nf ,
For all the players of Stackelberg game except leader nl,
Calculate C7-C8 by considering nl = 0 and Nnewnf as the set of followers,
If C7-C8 hold for nl,
Play RSG with nl as leader and others as followers:
1) Leader nl announces its strategy,
2) All the players of Nnl play the strategic game,
3) break.
otherwise nl = nl + 1,
continue ,
If nl = Nl + 1,
End.
TABLE IV
HEURISTIC PROTOCOL FOR CASE 2 OF MULTIPLE-LEADERS AND MULTIPLE-FOLLOWERS.
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Utility NE NSE RSE for heuristic algorithm
Leader 1 7.07 5.06 4.97
Leader 2 1.67 4.33 4.19
Follower 1.7 2.08 2.49
Social utility of the leader 2 and the follower 3.37 6.41 6.68
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF THE HEURISTIC PROTOCOL.
